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Abstract:
The recession of 2008-2009 showcased the critical role that the corporate bond market
plays in providing firms with access to capital, a role reflected by a 300% increase in corporate
bonds issued from $600 billion issued in 2007 to $1.8 trillion issued in 2012. In this study, I
investigate the bond specific, firm specific and macroeconomic factors that explain the change in
corporate credit spreads within the Consumer Staples industry between 2005 and 2013. The
results show that the firm specific variables, debt and total assets, have the largest impact on the
corporate credit spreads. However, there is a weaker relationship between the variables and the
corporate credit spread during recessionary times.
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1. Introduction
The corporate bond market has been a particularly important source of financing for
companies around the world for decades. The recession of 2008-2009 showcased the critical role
that the corporate bond market plays in providing firms with access to capital, a role reflected by
a 300% increase in corporate bonds issued from $600 billion issued in 2007 to $1.8 trillion
issued in 2012. Due to this significant increase in corporate bonds issued, a revisiting of the topic
of factors influencing the corporate bond spreads would contribute to the literature on capital
markets.
Investors inherently want to minimize risk while maximizing returns. One way of doing
this is to leverage their portfolios with a riskless security coupled with a riskier security. Hedge
fund investors, for example, will leverage corporate bonds in their portfolios by shorting U.S.
treasuries to hedge away the interest rate risk. This strategy causes changes in corporate credit
spreads to have an immediate impact on their portfolios as investors need to be cognizant of all
factors affecting their investment strategies, including investing in investment grade and high
yield corporate bonds.
The severity of the recession of 2008-2009 (and the subsequent quantitative easing by the
United States government) and its effect on the corporate bond market, call for a revisit of the
topic on the impact of firm specific factors on corporate credit spreads. A sample of large sized
firms from the Consumer Staples industry is used with a period spanning 2005-2013.
The results indicate the firm specific factors, debt and size have the largest impact on the
corporate credit spreads. Additionally, each variable had a different coefficient sign than its
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interaction variable. This shows that during a time of contraction in the economy, the
relationship between each of the variables and the corporate credit spread is weaker.
To outline the rest of this paper: the literature review will be discussed in Section 2. The
hypotheses are presented in Section 3. Data and methodology used for the regression will be
discussed in Section 4. The variables used for the regression will be discussed in this section. In
Section 5, the results from the regression will be explained and evaluated, and the conclusions
will be discussed in Section 6.

2. Theoretical Determinants of the Corporate Credit Spread
The factors that influence corporate credit spreads have been extensively researched
previously, but none of the previous studies include the recession of 2008-2009. The recession
caused worldwide financial turmoil that ultimately led to a bailout of financial institutions and
auto companies by the United States government.
Sargent (1979) explores the rational expectations theory for his study. He states that longterm yields are a function of current and past short-term interest rates. According to the rational
expectations theory, economic choices including those from corporations are based on a rational
outlook of all available information and past experiences. This explains that decisions made by
corporations are not irrational decisions because of the availability of perfect information. This
suggests that firm specific factors could influence changes in corporate credit spreads. The
rational expectations theory represents the underlying theory for my study.
Fisher (1959) pioneered the research on bond prices and that they are a function of firm
specific factors such as financial risk. First, he argues that the average risk premiums on a firm’s
bonds are contingent on the default risk as well as the bond’s marketability. Secondly, the default
4

risk can be predicted by three variables: the coefficient of variation of the firm’s net income over
the last nine years (after all charges and taxes are included), the length of time the firm has been
operating without forcing its creditors to take a loss, and the ratio of the market value of the
equity in the firm to the par value of the firm’s debt. Thirdly, he hypothesizes that the
marketability of a firm’s bonds can be estimated by a single variable: the market value of all the
public bonds outstanding. Lastly, a linear function of the logarithms of the variables just listed
estimate the average risk premium on a firm’s bonds. Fisher’s (1959) paper laid the foundation
for future research on the topic. For his data, he used only United States industrial firms to avoid
the industry specific factors and the foreign risks.
Black-Scholes (1973) in their famous “Black-Scholes Options Pricing Model” use the
underlying assumption that the rational expectations theory holds true. Their model presents a
complete general equilibrium theory of option pricing with a formula that has a function of
“observable” variables. Merton (1975) expands this model as he noted that corporate debt spread
depends on three things: the required rate of return on riskless debt (i.e., United States T-Bills),
the various restrictions detailed in the model (i.e., maturity date, etc.), and the probability that the
firm will default. This model with the underlying assumption of the rational expectations theory
represents the foundation for future research on pricing theories.
One of the drawbacks of the Black-Scholes Options Pricing Model is that default is
assumed to occur only when the firm exhausts its assets. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984)
shows that this aspect of the model implies credit spreads are much smaller than they actually
are. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) conclude that the Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA)
model appears to have an incremental explanatory power over the naïve model for noninvestment grade bonds, but no explanatory power for investment grade bonds. They also find
5

evidence that introducing stochastic interest rates and taxes would improve the model’s
performance.
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) build on Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld’s (1984) model by
incorporating both default risk and interest rate risk as well as allowing for deviations from strict
absolute priority. They show that the credit spreads implied by the model are consistent with
many of the properties of actual credit spreads. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) conclude that
evidence of a negative relationship for both changes in the short-term interest rates of corporate
bonds and changes in corporate asset value. This contradicts the traditional approach that credit
spreads depend only on the risk of default of the issuer. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) also
conclude that the difference in credit spreads across industries and sectors appear to be related to
differences in correlations between equity returns and changes in the interest rate. These changes
in interest rates account for more of the variation in credit spreads for investment grade bonds
than changes in the value of the assets of the firm. This evidence provides a strong indication that
both default risk and interest rate risk are necessary components for a valuation model for
corporate debt.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999) build on Longstaff and Schwartz’s (1995)
arguments by investigating the determinants of credit spread changes. They examine how
changes in credit spreads respond to representations for both changes in the probability of future
default and for changes in the recovery rate. They observe from a contingent-claims standpoint
that credit spreads change for two fundamental reasons: there is a risk of default, and the
bondholder receives only a percentage of the promised payouts in the event of default. CollinDufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999) conclude that, in contrast to the predications of structural
models of default, firm-specific factors appear to have less importance than aggregate factors.
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This result contrasts previous evidence on firm-specific factors affecting credit spread changes.
The authors inferred that the large variation of corporate credit spreads of an individual bond can
be explained by an aggregate factor common to all bonds.
Helwege and Turner (1999) investigate the yield curves of riskier firms or speculative
grade firms. They cite the work by Merton (1974) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) that
predicted upward sloping yield curves for investment grade corporate issuers and a downward
sloping or a hump-shaped yield curve for speculative grade firms. They conclude that, contrary
to many bond pricing models, there was no indication that a downward sloping yield curve exists
for speculative grade firms. Helwege and Turner (1999) suggest that researchers should be
careful when choosing values for their models that may result only on a downward sloping yield
curve for speculative grade firms. Those researchers should instead choose parameters for
leverage and firm specific risk which represent actual risk in the bond market.
Tang and Yan (2006) address several of the puzzles related to previous research. The first
issue is how the magnitude of corporate credit spreads predicted by theoretical models was
inconsistent with historical observations. Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) show that credit
spreads predicted by structural models are significantly lower than the observed levels,
especially for investment grade bonds. Secondly, the predicted shape of the credit yield spread
curve for high yield bonds is lower than historical observations. Helwege and Turner (1999)
argue that an upward yield spread curve for speculative grade corporate bonds contradicts BlackScholes (1973) and Merton’s (1974) model. The third issue is that some fundamental
determinants of corporate credit spreads continue to be indefinable. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein,
& Martin (1999) exhibit that in contrast to the predications of structural models of default; firmspecific factors appear to have less importance than aggregate factors. Tang and Yan (2006) find
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that their model, which has an emphasis on macroeconomic conditions, show equal results for
corporate credit spreads of both investment grade and speculative grade bonds. Their model also
generates an upward sloping yield curve for speculative grade firms just like that of Helwege and
Turner (1999). Tang and Yan (2006) also suggest that macroeconomic variables can describe a
substantial portion of yield spread changes. They conclude that macroeconomic factors could
potentially offer a clue to the missing factor of corporate bond valuation originally inferred by
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin (1999).

3. Hypothesis
This section presents the testable hypotheses for each variable of interest. Table 1 in the
Appendix shows all of the variables that will be used in the regression as well as predicted sign
of their relationship and a short definition of the variable. The variables are classified into three
different categories: bond specific factors, firm specific factors and macroeconomics factors.
Bond specific
Liquidity -

Amihud and Mendleson (1991) argue that bond risk premiums

should be higher for those bonds that cannot be easily sold or exchanged for cash without a
substantial loss in value, i.e. illiquid bonds.
Bao, Pan, Wang (2011) also looked at the impact of liquidity in the corporate bond
market on bond valuation. They examined the pricing impact of illiquidity in corporate bonds at
the individual bond level and the aggregate level. They found that illiquidity increases with a
bond’s age and maturity, but decreases with its issuance size. Bao, Pan, Wang (2011) also
concluded that bond illiquidity fluctuates substantially over time especially during economic
turmoil. Based on this evidence, I expect a negative relationship between the liquidity of the
bond and changes in corporate credit spreads.
I hypothesize that bonds with a higher liquidity have lower spreads.
8

Maturity-

Amihud and Mendleson (1991) state that the longer the time to

maturity of a bond is, the higher its risk premium should be due to the asset not being easily sold
or exchanged for cash without a substantial loss in value. Gkougkousi (2013) also argues that the
aggregate earnings-returns relation is lower for bonds with higher credit ratings and longer
maturities. This suggests that firms that issue bonds with a longer maturity date will be less
affected by changes in corporate credit spreads implying a positive relationship exists between
the time to maturity of a bond and changes in corporate credit spreads.
I hypothesize that bonds with longer maturities have higher spreads.
Firm specific
Profits-

Bai and Wu (2012) states that higher profitability reduce the

corporate credit spread. They claim that lower or even negative earnings often lead to a much
wider corporate credit spreads due to the inherent risk of an investment in a firm with negative
profits. Grabowski and King (2000) also find that firms with higher operating profit margins, or
other measures of profitability, are seen by investors as less risky due to their lower rates of
returns. This means that firms with higher profits should have a narrower credit spread.
I hypothesize that more profitable firms will have lower spreads.
Debt-

Flannery, Nikolova, & Öztekin (2012) test whether investors’

expectations for future debt or leverage of a firm affects the observed corporate bond credit
spreads. Their results indicate that expected increases in future leverage will be reflected in
higher credit spreads. This shows that when investors expect the debt of a firm to increase, the
corporate credit spread should increase as well.
I hypothesize that firms with lower debt will have lower spreads.
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Size-

Fama and French (1993) argue that small firms can suffer long

earnings depressions that do not affect large firms. This suggests that size might explain the
negative relationship between size and future returns as smaller firms often require larger
coverage ratios for the same credit rating as larger firms. Paschall and Hawkins (1999) state that
because smaller firms are generally accepted as riskier than larger firms, investors demand a
higher risk premium which means smaller firms have higher corporate credit spreads.
I hypothesize that larger sized firms will have lower spreads.
Macroeconomic factors
GDP growth rate-

Tang and Yan (2006) find in their studies that

macroeconomic variables can explain a substantial portion of corporate credit spread changes.
The gap between the corporate yields and United States T-Bill yields narrows creating an inverse
relationship between the GDP growth rate and corporate credit spreads.
I hypothesize that the larger the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate is, the lower
the spread will be.
VIX-

Nieto, Novales, & Rubio (2013) argue that the VIX is a key

determinant of the long-run component of volatility for corporate bonds. For high-rating bonds,
including the VIX improves the statistical model even during economic times of recession and
expansion. Lin (2013) also argues that investors can use the VIX to track the movement of the
SPX option implied volatility. This means that the VIX can be used as a measure of the market’s
future riskiness. When risk throughout the market is expected to increase, the VIX increases.
This would mean that corporate credit spreads should increase due to the riskiness. This indicates
a positive relationship should exist between the VIX and corporate credit spreads.
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I hypothesize that the larger the Volatility Index (VIX) is, the lower the spread
will be.

4. Data
In this study, I classify the factors explaining the corporate credit spreads into three
sections: bond specific factors, firm specific factors and macroeconomic factors. Bond specific
factors include liquidity of bonds (log of volume traded in millions), and maturity of the bonds
(quarters until the maturity date). Firm specific factors include size (log of total assets), profits
(return on assets), and debt (total debt outstanding divided by total assets). The macroeconomic
factors are the real GDP growth rate and the Volatility Index (VIX). These variables are a
function of the corporate credit spreads, as measured by the last price (spread to benchmark as
defined by Bloomberg) on a given day at quarter end. Table 1 in the Appendix shows all of the
variables including a short definition and their predicted signs. I also added an interaction
variable for each of the listed variables to help account for the 2008-2009 recession. I multiplied
each variable by the number 1 for each observation that occurred in either 2008 or 2009 (so 8
observations total). Then I multiplied each variable by the number 0 for each observation that did
not occur in either 2008 or 2009. This created an indicator variable which should help account
for the 2008-2009 recession.
The data series for this study was compiled from the Bloomberg database via a
COUNTRY Financial Bloomberg terminal. The dataset for this panel data research includes 24
publically traded firms in the Consumer Staples industry create. Table 2 in the Appendix lists all
24 firms, their tickers, market capitalization (cap) in billions, CUSIP of their bonds, and the
maturity date of their bonds. I use quarterly data with a range of December 2005 to December
2013 (32 observations per variable or 766 total observations). All of the bonds selected for this
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sample are investment grade bonds. Table 3 in the Appendix shows each sampled firm
categorized by its sub-industry within the Consumer Staples industry. Total and average market
capitalization of the firms is shown. The data was selected based on the availability of historical
spread data, so the majority of firms are large-cap and mid-cap sized firms with only one smallcap firm included. The transformation of the data included taking the logarithm of total assets
and volume traded to induce linearity.
Table 4 in the Appendix shows some summary statistics for all of the non-dummy
variables. The mean, median, minimum, and maximum values are shown in the table for both the
entire sample as well as the values just included in the 2008-2009 recession. All of the bond
specific and firm specific variables show little variation between the entire sample and the values
during the 2008-2009 recession. However, the dependent variable and the macroeconomic
variables show great difference between the entire sample and just the values of the 2008-2009
recession. The mean of the spread increases 28% in value while the maximum value of the entire
sample is set in the years of 2008-2009 (617.5090). The mean of the VIX shows an increase of
31% while the GDP growth rate shows a decrease of 133%. This means that expectations of
riskiness of the market grew significantly during the 2008-2009 recession while the economy
contracted considerably. These measures show the need to add the interaction variables to
account for the 2008-2009 recession.
One limitation of the data is the focus on the large market capitalization of all of the
firms. Ideally, different market capitalizations should equally be represented in the sample but
due to the availability of historical bond spreads, the majority of firms in the dataset are largecap or mid-cap sized firms. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows market capitalization of the S&P
500 Consumer Staples plotted with the market caps of the sampled firms. The two market
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capitalization lines follow the same trend until the 2008-2009 recession where a separation of the
two lines starts to occur.
For the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the equation used to determine the
effects of bond specific, firm specific and macroeconomic factors on the corporate credit spreads
is:
Corporate Credit Spread t = α
+ β(VIX)
+ β(Volume traded) + β(Volume traded Dummy)
+ β(Quarters until maturity) + β(Quarters until maturity Dummy)

+ β(Return on assets) + β(Return on assets Dummy)
+ β(Debt) + β(Debt times Dummy)
+ β(Total assets) + β(Total assets Dummy)
+ β(GDP growth rate) + β(GDP growth rate Dummy)
+ ε(t)

5. Results
Table 5 in the Appendix shows the regression results. The table shows the results of two
regressions: one without the VIX included as an independent variable and one with the VIX
included. Due to the VIX being a very similar variable to the interaction variables, both results
are shown. Including the VIX in the regression yields better results so that is the main results.
The macroeconomic factors had the expected impact as the VIX was statistically
significant with a positive coefficient of 2.1137. An increase in the coefficient results in an
increase in the corporate credit spread. Although the GDP growth rate is statistically
13

insignificant, its interaction variable has a coefficient of -33.6096. This means that during the
years of the 2008-2009 recession, a 1% decrease of the GDP growth rate would have caused
corporate credit spreads to increase by 33.609% (from its total sampled amount).
Among the bond specific factors, the maturity variable was statistically significant with a
positive coefficient of 0.2402. This means that a 10% increase in the number of quarters until a
particular bond matures will cause the corporate credit spread to increase by 2.402%.
Interestedly, the sign of the coefficient is negative for the interaction variable. This shows that
during times of contractions in the economy, shorter duration bonds are riskier than longer
duration bonds.
For the firm specific factors, debt and total assets were statistically significant. The debt
had a positive coefficient of 20.578 meaning a 1% increase in a firm’s debt will cause the
corporate credit spread to increase by 20.578%. Total assets had a negative coefficient of -21.187
meaning a 1% decrease in a firm’s size will cause the corporate credit spread to increase by
21.187%. Both results are consistent with previous evidence as firms with larger debt should be
seen as riskier with a wider corporate credit spread while larger firms should be seen as less risky
so they will have a narrower corporate credit spread. Just like with the bond specific factors, all
three variables’ coefficient signs changed during times of contraction in the economy.
The change of the sign of the interaction variables does not mean a total switch of signs
during times of recession, rather the variables’ relationship with the corporate credit spread is
weaker during times of contraction in the economy.
The r-squared is 0.3316 which reflects the overall goodness of fit for this regression. The
F-statistic is 28.6949 and is statistically significant which shows that the model fits the
population of the sampled data well.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, I employ an OLS regression on a sample of quarterly data obtained from
the Bloomberg Database with a range of December 2005 to September 2013. The dependent
variable is the corporate credit spread as defined as last price on a given day at quarter end with
the independent variables being separated into three sections: bond specific, firm specific, and
macroeconomic factors. The bond specific variables include liquidity of bonds (volume traded in
millions), and maturity of the bonds (quarters until the maturity date). Firm specific factors
include size (log of total assets), profits (return on assets), and debt (total debt outstanding
divided by total assets). The macroeconomic factors are the real GDP growth rate and the
Volatility Index (VIX). Interaction variables were also introduced to take into account the 20082009 recession.
Of the variables, the VIX with a 2.1137 coefficient, quarters to maturity with a 0.2402
coefficient, debt with a 20.5758 coefficient, total assets with a -21.1873, and GDP growth rate’s
interaction variable with a -33.6096 coefficient were all statistically significant. Interestedly
enough, all of the variables that included an interaction variable, had a different coefficient sign
than their interaction variable. This shows that during a time of contraction in the economy, each
of these variables has a weaker relationship with the corporate credit spread. Due to debt’s and
total asset’s large coefficient, these two firm specific factors could help explain the corporate
credit spread a little better than most other variables.
Future avenues of research should include a sample of firms from a cyclical different
industry to see if a difference may exist from industry to industry. Also, future research should
try to get an equal representation of large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap sized firms.
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Investors could possibly modify their bond management strategies when it comes to
buying and selling bonds due to this study. Due to relationships between debt and total assets
with the corporate credit spread, investors could examine a firm’s debt and size of total assets
before they buy or sell bonds. Now, the results of this paper do not simply state that an investor
should always examine just a firm’s debt and total assets before deciding whether to buy or sell a
particular bond. Rather, this paper shows that debt and total assets of a firm are a good indicator
of a firm’s riskiness as shown in their corporate credit spread.
Another interesting finding of this paper was what the interaction variables showed.
When corporate credit spreads begin to change, observations of all of these variables, including
changes in the sign of the coefficients, could help add evidence to arguments that a recession or
boom of the economy could occur.
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Appendix:
Table 1: Explanation of variables

Name
Dependent
Bond
Specific
Firm
Specific

Macroeconomic

Dummy

Predicted
sign

Spread
Liquidity

Negative

Maturity

Positive

Profits
Debt
Size
GDP growth
rate

Negative
Positive
Negative

VIX

Positive

Interaction
Variable

Negative

Definition
Difference in bond yield and U.S. treasury
yield with same date to maturity.
Volume traded of particular bond expressed in
millions.
Number of quarters until particular bond
matures.
Return on assets of firm.
Total debt outstanding divided by total assets.
Total assets expressed in logarithms.
Real GDP growth rate expressed as a
percentage and adjusted for inflation.
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
Volatility Index (VIX).
Interaction variable for each variable to
account for 2008-2009 recession.
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Table 2: Firms

Name
The Coca-Cola Company
Pepsico, Inc.
Mondelez International Inc.
Kellogg Company
Hershey Co
ConAgra Foods, Inc.
Campbell Soup Company
The Procter & Gamble
Company
Colgate-Palmolive Company
Kimberly Clark Corp
Estee Lauder Companies Inc
E I Du Pont De Nemours And
Co
Altria Group Inc
Tyson Foods, Inc.
Avon Products, Inc.
Hillshire Brands Co
Bunge Ltd
Dean Foods Co
Archer Daniels Midland
Company
CVS Caremark Corporation
Safeway Inc.
SYSCO Corporation
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Kroger Company

Market Cap (in
billions)
KO
167.95
PEP
121.9
MDLZ 59.28
K
21.94
HSY
23.63
CAG
11.93
CPB
13.55

191219ayo
713409ac4
50075nac8
487836at5
427866al2
205887ar3
134429ag4

Date of
maturity
11/15/2026
3/1/2029
11/1/2031
4/1/2031
8/15/2027
10/1/2028
5/1/2021

PG

210.08

742718cb3

2/1/2034

CL
KMB
EL

57.18
41.37
26.55

19416qce8
494368as2
29736raa8

6/16/2028
1/1/2028
10/15/2033

DD

61.13

263534bg3

1/15/2028

MO
TSN
AVP
HSH
BG
DF

72.64
13.2
6.53
4.59
11.57
1.4

718154cf2
902494ad5
054303ar3
803111am5
120568al4
242361ab9

1/15/2027
1/15/2028
7/15/2018
11/1/2032
4/15/2014
10/15/2017

ADM

26.26

039483ah5

4/15/2017

CVS
SWY
SYY
WMT
KR

85.83
8.76
21.06
240.3
21.66

126650av2
786514ba6
871829af4
931142bf9
501044bz3

9/15/2014
2/1/2031
8/1/2028
2/15/2030
4/1/2031

Ticker

CUSIP
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Table 3: Sub-Industries
Sub-Industry
Food Processing (10)
Personal & Household (5)
Beverages (2)
Tobacco (1)
Other (6)

Total Market Cap
187.35
341.71
289.85
72.64
417.08

Average Market Cap
18.735
68.342
144.925
72.64
83.416

Figure 1: Market Cap (S&P 500 Consumer Staples vs. Sampled Firms)

2000000
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1400000
1200000

S&P 500
Consumer
Staples
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800000
600000
400000
200000
0
6/1/2013

12/1/2012

6/1/2012

12/1/2011

6/1/2011

12/1/2010

6/1/2010

12/1/2009

6/1/2009

12/1/2008

6/1/2008

12/1/2007

6/1/2007

12/1/2006

6/1/2006

12/1/2005

Sample Firms
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Table 4: Summary Statistics

Spread

VIX

Volume

Quarters to
Maturity

Return on
Assets

Debt

Total Assets

GDP growth
rate

Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum

Sample
153.6293
127.5568
-0.6937
617.5090
21.3714
17.7400
11.3900
44.1400
8.0375
7.9542
6.0000
10.4419
68.4410
74.8278
2.1889
114.0000
8.1972
8.2941
-22.9819
26.9388
0.4263
0.3019
0.0428
3.1856
4.3024
4.2222
3.3863
5.3220
0.3298
0.3955
-2.1517
1.2135

2008-2009
214.4577
196.0689
49.8479
617.5090
30.8413
25.9800
21.6800
44.1400
7.9216
7.8603
6.0000
10.1761
71.3551
78.0500
17.4000
104.8667
8.2995
8.2083
-6.7646
26.9388
0.4224
0.3009
0.0428
3.0700
4.2875
4.2438
3.5433
5.2368
-0.2472
0.1059
-2.1517
0.9561
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Table 5: Regression Results

C

Dependent Variable: Spread
218.6759***
6.7636

VIX
Volume
Volume Dummy
Quarters to Maturity
Quarters to Maturity Dummy
Return on Assets
Return on Assets Dummy
Debt
Debt Dummy
Total Assets
Total Assets Dummy
GDP Growth Rate
GDP Growth Rate Dummy
Observations
R-squared

-1.8656
-0.6076
-0.7338
-0.1374
0.178
1.5264
-0.1919
-0.7900
-0.4834
-0.8584
0.0713
0.0640
21.1777***
3.9281
-12.8865
-1.1625
-20.4654***
-3.3813
21.5848**
2.1495
1.3390
0.2075
-51.9719***
-6.2851
766
0.3023

168.6778***
5.1357
2.1137***
4.503
-0.0772
-0.0255
-2.6042
-0.4970
0.2402**
2.0943
-0.2585
-1.0855
-0.5087
-0.9223
0.1964
0.1802
20.5783***
3.8962
-13.1360
-1.2098
-21.1873***
-3.5732
19.5715***
1.9886
-5.5393
-0.8610
-33.6096***
-3.8594
766
0.3316
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